Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. The most controversial and yet unresolved issue in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play an important role in economic relations, political struggles and legal disputes. Yet, so far there is little rigorous evidence supporting this intuition. In this paper we provide clear and unambiguous experimental evidence for the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Our results indicate that the attribution of fairness intentions is important both in the domain of negatively reciprocal behavior and in the domain of positively reciprocal behavior. This means that reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account players' fairness intentions and distributional preferences are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively on intentions or on the distribution of material payoffs are not. JEL-Classification: D63, C78, C91.
I. Introduction
A considerable body of evidence indicates that a substantial number of the people are motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, the presence of fair-minded people is likely to have important economic effects (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; Camerer and Thaler 1995; Bewley 1999; Fehr and Gächter 2000) . This has led to the development of several fairness models (Rabin 1993 . These models share the property that some people are assumed to have a preference for fairness -in addition to their preference for material payoffs. The impressive feature of these models is that they are capable of predicting correctly a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. This paper examines the most controversial question in the modeling of fairness preferences: the role of fairness intentions. Do fair-minded people respond to fair or unfair intentions or do they respond solely to fair or unfair outcomes? One class of fairness models -the equity models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) -is based on the assumption that fairness intentions are behaviorally irrelevant. Another class of models (e.g., Rabin 1993 , Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999 assigns fairness intentions a major behavioral role.
The answer to our question is of great practical and theoretical interest. At the theoretical level the question concerns not only the proper modeling of fairness preferences but also standard utility theory. Standard utility theory assumes that the utility of an action depends solely on the consequences of the action and not on the intention behind the action.
Therefore, if the attribution of intentions turns out to be behaviorally important, the "consequentialism" inherent in standard utility models is also in doubt. At the practical level the issue is important because many relevant decisions are likely to be affected if the attribution of intentions matters. Fairness attributions are likely to influence decision-making in firms and other organizations as well as in markets and the political arena. Political decisions and business decisions, for instance, often affect the material payoffs of some parties negatively. If the response of the negatively affected parties also takes into account the decision-maker's fairness intentions, it will be much easier to prevent opposition when the decision-maker can credibly claim that he is somehow forced -by law, by international competition or by some other external force -to take the action. It is, therefore, no coincidence that the rhetoric of politicians and business leaders often appeals to the phrase that "there is no alternative". If there is indeed no alternative it is not possible to attribute unfair intentions to the action because the decision-maker cannot be held responsible for the action. If, in contrast, there are obvious alternative actions available, it is much easier for the affected parties to attribute unfair intentions to the action and, as a consequence, their opposition will be much stronger.
The attribution of intentions is also important in law (Huang 2000) . Intentions often distinguish between whether the same action is a tort or a crime and whether a tort should involve punitive damages. Other distinctions made in criminal law concern whether an action is taken purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently (see Model Penal Code § 2.02(1)- (2)). Thus, the penal code (which represents a codified broad sense of justice) distinguishes quite carefully between the consequences of an action and the intentions underlying this action. Although, at the intuitive level, the attribution of intentions seems to be important, so far it has been rather difficult to provide rigorous and unambiguous evidence for this. This is not surprising with regard to field data because outcomes and intentions are usually inextricably intertwined in the field. Yet, even in laboratory experiments the issue has been quite elusive. Charness (1996) , Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998), Offerman (1999) and Cox (2000) find little or no evidence that the attribution of fairness intentions matters in the domain of positively reciprocal behavior. Blount (1995) and Offerman (1999) find evidence that it matters in the domain of negatively reciprocal behavior but, as we will argue below, these studies have some methodological problems. 1 Thus, we face the puzzle that, intuitively, the attribution of fairness intentions seems to be important while given the prevailing evidence, the issue remains highly controversial.
In this paper we provide clear and unambiguous experimental evidence for the behavioral relevance of fairness attributions. Our results indicate that the attribution of fairness intentions is important both in the domain of negatively reciprocal behavior and in the domain of positively reciprocal behavior. When the experimental design rules out the attribution of fairness intentions, reciprocal responses are substantially weaker. This result is 1 Positive reciprocity is defined as a kind response to an action that leads to a fair outcome or is driven by fair intentions. Negative reciprocity is defined as a hostile response to an action that leads to an unfair outcome or is driven by an unfair intention. The paper is organized as follows. The next section shortly discusses potential obstacles in finding behavioral effects of fairness intentions. Section III presents the experimental design. Section IV discusses the predictions of several fairness theories. Results are presented in Section V. Section VI gives a short summary.
II. Obstacles for Finding Behavioral Effects of Fairness Intentions
Before we present our experimental design it is important to discuss the potential reasons for the lack of convincing evidence in favor of fairness intentions. In our view, there are four potential reasons. The first reason is that in some studies there is a potential confound with the efficiency motive. Andreoni and Miller (2000) , Bolle and Kritikos (1998) and Charness and Rabin (2000) report results suggesting the presence of a non-negligible fraction of subjects that is willing to increase efficiency. These subjects seem to be willing to bear some cost in order to increase the total payoff, i.e., the sum of the payoffs that accrues to all the parties. This motive could have swamped the positively reciprocal responses in the studies of Charness (1996) , Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) and Offerman (1999) because in these studies the reciprocal behavior of the second-mover was associated with large efficiency increases. It is also possible that reciprocity motives and efficiency motives interact in a yet unknown way. For this reason our design rules out that reciprocal responses increase the total payoff.
A second reason is related to the issue of repetition. In Charness (1996) subjects faced a different opponent in each of ten periods. Repetitions may create all sorts of ill-understood noise and spillovers across periods that make it difficult to isolate the attribution of fairness intentions. For this reason we conducted a one-shot experiment without any repetitions.
A third potential reason for the lack of a behavioral impact of fairness intentions could be that the treatment manipulations were not strong enough. To isolate the role of fairness intentions one ideally needs a treatment in which first-movers can signal their fairness intentions and a treatment in which such signals are ruled out completely. The signaling of fairness intentions rests on two premises: (i) The first-mover's choice set actually allows the choice between a fair and an unfair action, and (ii) the first-mover's choice is under the full control of the first-mover. The first premise implies that the treatment manipulation can be "too weak" because the choices available to the first-mover may not be sufficiently different,
i.e., the fairness or unfairness of the available actions is not salient enough. In our design we solved this problem by giving the first-mover a choice set that allows for very different actions. In particular, the first-mover could either increase or decrease the second-movers payoff relative to a clearly defined reference point (i.e., relative to an initial endowment that was the same for both players). This distinguishes our study from the studies of Charness (1996), Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) and Cox (2000) where the first movers could only be more or less kind to the second-movers but they could not hurt them. Perhaps, the distinction between being more or less kind was not salient enough and, as a consequence, there was little or no intention-driven reciprocal behavior in these studies.
The fourth reason is related to the second premise above. It concerns the question of how one can rule out the attribution of fairness intentions to the first mover's choice. In our view the strongest method is to deprive the first mover of any choice at all and to make this salient to the second mover. In our experiment we achieved this by determining the first mover's "action" by a salient random device. Saliency was implemented by rolling dice in front of each second mover. Yet, if the first mover's choice is determined by a random device, the second movers might have views about what constitutes fair or unfair random devices. For example, if the random device determines with high probability a very bad outcome for the second mover, the second mover may become angry because she views this as a rather unfair device. If, in contrast, human first movers are unlikely to choose such a bad outcome the comparison of responses across the random device and the human choice condition does not isolate the impact of fairness intentions. The reason is that there is likely to be a confound due to the angry response to an unfair random device. Our solution of this problem is to implement a random device that mimics the probability distribution over the actions of human first movers.
Both in Blount (1995) and Offerman (1999) the first mover's "action" was determined by a random device. Yet, only Blount kept the probability distribution of first mover actions constant across the random device and the human choice condition. Although the study of Blount is very clean and convincing in this regard it faces other methodological problems.
The results of her ultimatum game may be affected by the fact that subjects in the human choice condition had to make decisions as a proposer and as a responder before they were to know their actual roles. After subjects had made their decisions in both roles, the role for which they received payments was determined randomly. This means that the decision situation was not kept constant across the random device and the human choice condition because in the human choice condition the responders also had to put themselves in the shoes of the proposers while in the random device condition this was not the case.
In one of Blount's treatments deception was involved. Subjects believed that there were proposers although in fact the experimenters made the proposals. All subjects in this condition were "randomly" assigned to the responder role. It may well be the case that this kind of deception cannot be hidden from the subjects, i.e., at least a number of subjects might have noticed that they were deceived. In contrast to this setting subjects in our experiment knew their role in all conditions before they made decisions and we had real human subjects in the first-mover position and in the second-mover position.
III. Experimental Design and Procedures
Our experimental design is based on the "moonlighting game" (Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner 2000) . This game has the advantage that we can examine the impact of fairness intentions on positively as well as on negatively reciprocal responses at the individual level.
In the following we first describe the moonlighting game. Then we present our two treatments, the Intention treatment and the No-Intention treatment. Finally, we report the procedures of the experiment.
The constituent game. The "moonlighting game" is a two-player sequential move game that In our experiment we applied the strategy method. This means that player B had to give us a response for each feasible action of player A, before B was informed about the actual choice of A. This has several advantages 2 . First, it allows us to examine the correlation between positive and negative reciprocity at the individual level. Thus, we know whether there are subjects who exhibit only negatively reciprocal responses or only positively reciprocal responses, or whether those who are negatively reciprocal are also positively reciprocal. Second, as we will see, the strategy method allows us to study the relevance of intentions for reciprocal behavior at any level of a. This is so because we have sufficiently many responses to each feasible action of A. The random move of A in the NI-treatment was implemented as follows: After B had determined her strategy, the experimenter went to her place and threw two dice in front of B.
Both dice were ten-sided showing numbers from 0 to 9, i.e., together they created numbers between zero and 99 with equal probability. The number that was determined was then used to determine the move of A according to Table 1 . For example, if the dice showed a number between 0 and 6, A's random move was to take 6 points (a = -6), while if the number was, e.g., 58, player A's move was a = 3. After the move of A had been determined, the experimenter went to another player B and threw the dice again. This procedure was explained to the Bs in great detail in the instructions. Thus, it was completely transparent to each B that A's move was determined randomly according to Table 1 . Players A also knew that their choice would be randomly determined but they did not know the probability distribution.
Notice that according to Table 1 the randomly determined moves of A are not equally likely. For example, it is more likely to randomly select a = -6 (7 percent chance) than a = -5 (2 percent chance). Table 1 is based on the actual human decisions of the As who participated in the moonlighting experiment by Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000) . Using this table we are able to approximate a 'human choice distribution' even in the NI-treatment where choices were randomly selected. To keep everything constant except the potential for the attributions of intentions across the NI-and the I-treatment, the choice distribution given in Table 1 was also presented to the Bs in the I-condition 3 . In this condition it was pointed out to the Bs that the same experiment had already been conducted before and that the relative frequency of the decisions by the As in that experiment was identical to the frequencies in Table 1 . This was done to induce players B to have the same beliefs about the choice distribution of the As in both treatment conditions. In this way we ruled out the possibility that the responses of the Bs were affected by different beliefs about the choice 3 As in the NI-treatment, the As were not informed about the choice distribution in Table 1. distribution of the As. 4 Thus, with regard to the probability distribution over the set of feasible actions the two treatments cannot evoke different fairness judgements. 
Procedure. Before the game started, subjects were randomly assigned to their role as player A or B (in both treatments). They were seated in front of their terminal and given their instructions. To ensure the understanding of the experimental procedures all subjects had to answer several control questions and the experiment did not start until all subjects had answered all questions correctly. Procedures and payoff functions were known by all the players, i.e., they were explained in the instructions and orally summarized. We used the experimental software z-Tree ) to run the experiments.
IV. Predictions
In the following we derive the theoretical predictions for our experimental game. First, we shortly present the economic prediction based on the assumption that it is common knowledge that all players are selfish and rational followed by the predictions of recently developed fairness theories.
Self Interest Prediction.
If it is common knowledge that all players are selfish and rational the following subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is predicted: In both treatments B will always choose b = 0, i.e., she will neither punish nor reward, because any other choice is costly. Therefore, in the I-treatment player A will choose a = -6 because he only loses if he chooses a > 0 and has nothing to fear if a < 0. In the NI-treatment, player A's move is determined by a random device.
Fairness Predictions.
We now turn to the predictions of recently developed fairness theories.
Our focus is the behavior of player B. The models by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) A different concept of reciprocity starts with the premise that reciprocal responses are triggered exclusively by kind or unkind intentions (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999) 5 .
From this premise it immediately follows that in the absence of fairness intentions there should be no reciprocal behavior at all, i.e., player B neither rewards nor punishes but pursues her material self-interest. Therefore, in the NI-treatment Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger predict no reciprocal behavior at all (b = 0, ∀a). The prediction for the Itreatment is less clear. The reason for this is that the model exhibits multiple equilibria and some of them are compatible with b being locally decreasing in a. This is so because according to the model higher values of a do not necessarily signal more friendly intentions 6 .
There are, however, plausible equilibria where a > 0 signals good intentions and a < 0 signals bad intentions. In these equilibria b is increasing in a (in the I-treatment).
Finally there is the model by Falk and Fischbacher (1999) that combines a concern for a fair distribution of payoffs with the reward and punishment of fair and unfair intentions. In the I-treatment the model makes the (unique) prediction that b is increasing in a. In the NItreatment, this reciprocal pattern is predicted to be weaker compared to the I-treatment.
Contrary to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, the model does not predict b = 0, ∀a since players in this model not only have a concern for intentions but also for a fair distribution of the payoffs. However, since intentions are absent in the NI-treatment subjects react less reciprocally than in the I-treatment. The latter prediction distinguishes Falk and Fischbacher from the inequity aversion models by Bolton and Ockenfels and Fehr and Schmidt. Table 2 summarizes all predictions. Notice that all fairness theories make similar predictions in the Itreatment but differ in their predictions for the NI-treatment. . This means that a = -6 does in fact signal more friendly intentions than a = -5, which in turn justifies the higher punishments. Thus, it is possible in the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger model that a = -5 is punished more than a = -6 in equilibrium. 7 See discussion in the text.
V. Results
In total 112 subjects participated in the experiment (66 in the I-treatment and 46 in the NItreatment). All subjects were students from the University of Our main result is shown in Figure 1 . measures. Again, this holds (weakly) for all give-decisions. In the last row of Table 3 , we present the results of the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test, which was run to check whether the decisions of the Bs are significantly different across treatments. For almost all a > 0 and a < 0, behavior is indeed significantly different across treatments at the five percent level. For a = 5 it is significant at the ten percent level. Given the results shown in Table 3 we can reject the predictions by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . Behavior in the NI-treatment is significantly different from that in the I-treatment for all give-and take-decisions. Put differently, our results indicate that on an aggregate level intentions matter both in the domain of positive as well as in the domain of negative reciprocity.
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The behavioral relevance of fairness intentions can also be shown with the help of regression analysis. Table 4 shows a regression model where the impact of B's decision is regressed on A's move (a). In this model we also include a dummy variable for the Itreatment (I) and an interaction term a×I. This specification allows us to estimate different linear fits for the I-and for the NI-treatment and, thus, to asses the difference between the two treatments. The result of this regression is shown in Table 4 . The coefficient of the interaction term a×I is highly significant while the dummy variable for the I-treatment (I) is not significantly different from zero. This means that for a = 0 there is no difference between the treatments but for sufficiently high or low a, the reciprocal responses of the Bs are stronger in the I-treatment compared with the NI-treatment. This result confirms the statistical test presented in Table 3 . Furthermore, the regression allows us to test whether in the NI-treatment reciprocity is wiped out completely as predicted by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1999) . So far we have restricted our analysis to aggregate behavior. However, since the Bs had to indicate a decision for each of A's possible actions, we can also study individual patterns of behavior. 11 The first column shows the percentage of subjects who neither reward nor sanction, i.e., whose behavior is in accordance with the standard economic prediction (b = 0, ∀a). The second column reports the percentage of subjects who reward or sanction. The percentage of subjects who exhibit positive as well as negative reciprocity is given in column 10 To check the robustness of this finding, we also calculated the Spearman rank correlation between the average impact of B's decisions on A's payoff and the corresponding moves by A. The resulting coefficients are 0.8721 for the NI-treatment and 0.9945 for the I-treatment. Both coefficients are significant at any conventional level (p < 0.001). 11 In the Appendix, where we show all individual decisions, we also indicate how each subject is assigned to the different behavioral categories.
3. The percentage of those who reward are listed in column 4 while the percentage of those who sanction are listed in column 5. The sixth column, finally, consists of subjects whose rewarding or sanctioning behavior is very unsystematic. Most of these subjects rewarded a particular transfer and -at the same time -sanctioned a higher transfer. *The classification is constructed as follows: First, all subjects who show 'other patterns' (column 5) are sorted out. This category contains (i) subjects with a negative correlation between a and b, (ii) subjects who reward a give-decision a > 0 while they sanctioned a higher give-decision a' > a and (iii) subjects with an unconditional non-zero transfer decision. The rest of the subjects is classified into the other categories. Subjects who never reward or sanction (b = 0), are assigned to the first column. Subjects who reward an a > 0 at least once or sanction an a < 0 at least once are assigned to the second column. Subjects who reward an a > 0 at least once and sanction an a < 0 at least once are assigned to the third column. Subjects who reward an a > 0 at least once are counted in the fourth column and subjects who sanction an a < 0 at least once are assigned to column 5. Table 5 shows that individual behavioral patterns between the two treatments are quite This interpretation is also consistent with the second result in Table 5 (see column 2):
12
The percentage of subjects who are either positively or negatively reciprocal drops from 76 percent in the I-treatment to 39 percent in the NI-treatment. This (highly significant) difference indicates that many reciprocal players are willing to reward or sanction only if the corresponding action by A signals fair or unfair intentions. However, reciprocity in the NItreatment is not wiped out completely. Almost 40 percent of the subjects show some reciprocal behavior. We take this evidence (which is in line with the regression results presented in Table 4 ) as a further indication that reciprocal behavior is not solely intentiondriven, but also by concerns for fair outcomes.
It is also interesting to know the fraction of subjects who exhibit both positively and negatively reciprocal behavior. Column 3 shows that 40 percent of the subjects in the Icondition and 18 percent in the NI-condition exhibit this pattern. Thus, the possibility to infer intentions also raises the percentage of subjects who exhibit both types of reciprocity significantly. Column 4 and 5 further support our previous conclusion that fairness intentions significantly increase the willingness to reciprocate and that even in the absence of fairness intentions there is a non-negligible percentage of people who reciprocate.
VI. Discussion
In his classic account of reciprocity Gouldner (1960) conjectured that the force of reciprocity depends on the motives imputed to the donor and the donor's own free will.
Although this notion of reciprocity is highly suggestive it has so far been quite difficult to provide direct and unambiguous evidence for the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions.
We have discussed several potential reasons for this and designed an experiment that avoids potential confounds with other sources of reciprocal behavior. Our results provide clean evidence that in judging the fairness of an action, people do not only take into account the distributive consequences of an action but also the intention that is signaled by the action.
This result not only casts serious doubt on the consequentialist practice in standard economic theory that defines the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of this action. It also shows that the recently developed models of fairness by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) are incomplete to the extent that they neglect "nonconsequentialist" reasons for reciprocally fair actions. Our results also show that even in an environment where actions do not signal any intentions, there is still some reciprocal behavior, i.e., the fairness of the outcome matters, too. The fact that reciprocity is not solely triggered by kind or unkind intentions implies that the pure intentions models of Rabin 
